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Abstract
Unemployment compensation in the United States is provided through a federal-state system
of unemployment insurance (UI).  UI provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job
seekers who are involuntarily out of work.  For older workers, UI is an important source of income
security and a potential influence on work incentives.
For many, the transition from full-time work in a career job to retirement is voluntary and
orderly.  For others, job displacement greatly disrupts plans.  The transition often involves many
intermediate steps.  The chain of transitions may include full- or part-time work on another job which
most often is not in the same industry and occupation (a bridge job).  There may also be movement
between bridge jobs, perhaps back from a bridge job to a career job, and finally a gradual movement
into full retirement while out of the labor force.  
Many issues at the forefront of current UI policy debate are also issues of prime importance
to those in the second half of  their working life.  Issues occur in all the standard areas of UI policy:
coverage, eligibility, benefit adequacy, duration of benefits, work incentives, benefit financing, and
interaction with other programs.  This paper provides a brief background sketch of the labor market
situation of older workers to examine issues of prime concern to older workers in these areas of UI
policy.  
Our survey of policy issues suggests that changes in UI  rules concerning, initial eligibility,
continuing eligibility, wage replacement, and partial benefits should all be examined to evaluate effects
on the likely employment patterns of older workers.  Particular attention should be given to UI
features affecting the choice of self-employment, part-time work, seasonal work, and agricultural
jobs.  
The financing consequences of  possible UI program changes should also be estimated, as
should the macroeconomic impact of broadening recipiency.  UI program features which would
promote flexible and extended labor force participation by older workers should also enrich the
employment choice environment for other workers.  Therefore, it would be useful to examine the
impact of such program changes on UI as a built-in stabilizer of aggregate expenditures.  
While younger workers are usually committed to long-term participation in the labor force,
older citizens are often more flexible in choosing to use their time.  Worsening labor shortage
conditions in the United States mean that efforts to retain older workers in the labor force will
intensify.  The current and potential influence of UI on the income security and labor force
participation of older workers should be well understood.  1
1Burtless (1999) summarizes retirement trends and economic research focusing on retirement incentives.  
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1.  Introduction
Unemployment compensation in the United States is provided through a federal-state system
of unemployment insurance (UI).  UI provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job
seekers who are involuntarily out of work.  Eligibility for UI benefits and compensation levels depend
on recent earnings experience, the conditions of job separation, and continuing job search activity.
 The amount of compensation paid for any week of joblessness can be affected by current income
from other sources, including part-time work and pensions.  
During the second half of the working life, decisions about the process and timing of
movement toward full retirement move to the forefront.  For many, the sequence is voluntary and
orderly; for others, job displacement greatly disrupts plans.  While UI is critical for income security
of the latter group, it may also play an important role for former.   
Most economic analysis of retirement patterns has focused on the financial incentives created
by public and private pension systems.
1  Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990, p. 5) point out that
while an abrupt and complete transition from full-time work is still the most common avenue to
retirement, a variety of others paths are often taken.  A crucial concept in their research is that of the
career job.  The career job is the one on which a worker spends the bulk of their working life, usually
working full time.  If transition from the career job to retirement is not immediate, it may involve an
hours reduction to part-time work on the career job.  Alternatively, there may be an exit from the
career job to full- or part-time work on another job, which most often is not in the same industry and
occupation.  
Bridge employment is what Quinn (1999) calls work between the career job and complete
retirement.  He estimates that a minimum of 49 percent of women and 34 percent of men engage in
bridge employment, and that the great majority of bridge employment involves fewer hours per week
and less compensation per hour than the career job.  The probability of involuntary exit from the
career job later in life is high and has risen in recent years (Farber, 1997).  Furthermore, the chance
of gaining reemployment after displacement from a career job diminishes with age (Chan and Stevens,
1999).    
Job and income security after age 45 and strategies for transition to retirement can be greatly
influenced by the institutional arrangements of UI.  Many issues at the forefront of current UI policy
debate are also issues of prime importance to those in the second half of  their working life.  Issues
occur in all the standard areas of UI policy: coverage, eligibility, benefit adequacy, duration of
benefits, work incentives, benefit financing, and interaction with other programs.  We proceed to
examine issues of prime concern to older workers in these areas of UI policy after providing a brief
background sketch of the labor market situation of older workers.  2
2Methods for collection and use of the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data is given in U.S.
Department of Labor (1996).  The BAM samples are drawn in the fifty states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
Procedures are designed to yield samples representative of week of benefits paid from each state's universe of paid UI
claims.  
2.  Background
Whether they can admit it to themselves or not, the second half of their working life starts by
age 45 for the great majority of Americans.  In this paper we examine the labor market and UI
beneficiary experience of those aged 45 and over in comparison to those who are younger.  The
investigation is summary in nature and meant to suggest topic areas where focused research would
be valuable.  We rely on published summary statistics reported in the Handbook of U.S. Labor
Statistics, Third Edition, 1999, the Social Security Administration’s publication Income of the
Population 55 or Older—1996, on samples drawn for evaluation and modeling in the states of
Michigan and Washington, and on unpublished data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor based
on their Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) system of random audits.
2
The percentages of older workers among the labor force, the total unemployed, and the
insured unemployed are reported in Table 1 for the United States in 1998.  The figures are based on
monthly averages for the year and indicate that those aged 45 years and over made up one-third of
the labor force, encompassed only one-fifth of those experiencing unemployment, but included one-
third of all UI beneficiaries. Table 2 provides an age distribution of insured unemployment by state
for 1998.  It is interesting to note that the retirement states Arizona and Florida reasonably mimic the
national shares of UI receipt by age, while the District of Columbia pays a disproportionately large
share to older workers, and payments are weighted heavily toward younger workers in Maryland,
Oregon, and Puerto Rico.  The national average numbers suggest that older workers shoulder a
proportionately small share of the unemployment burden while enjoying a higher-than-average chance
of receiving UI compensation while jobless and seeking work. 
These summary statistics on UI recipiency for older workers are at odds with trends
experienced by the work force as a whole since the state UI reforms following the 1975 and 1982
recessions.  Vroman (1991) summarized research into causes of the decline in the ratio of the insured
to total unemployment rate (IUR/TUR).  Burtless (1983) identified a raft of factors including
tightened eligibility requirements, a rising level of UI exhaustions, and the introduction of income
taxes on UI benefits.  This last factor operates because those from higher-income households are less
likely to apply for benefits.  Blank and Card (1991) found the decline partly explained by tightened
eligibility, but largely due to a decline in UI benefit application rates.  They estimated the overall take-
up rate among those eligible for UI benefits to be only about 65 percent.  Corson and Nicholson
(1988) identified declines in unionism and manufacturing employment as causes of a  declining
IUR/TUR ratio.  Concerning older workers, Corson and Nicholson (1988) suggested that changed
treatment of the pension benefit offset required by the federal unemployment compensation
amendments of 1976 may explain part of the declining IUR/TUR. Details about the treatment of
pensions in UI are provided below.  3
3Policy definitions are given in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) Act
of 1988.  These definitions largely carried over to the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998.  An overview of
research applications of this concept are given in Leigh (1990).  
4Hipple’s (1999a) data is from the Displaced Worker survey, which is conducted every 2 years by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics to provide information on the number and characteristics of persons who have been displaced from
their jobs over the past three years.  Based on a supplement to the February 1998 Current Population Survey, the latest
study is for the period 1995-1996.  It reveals that between 1995 and 1996, 2.2 million workers aged 20 years or older
lost jobs they had held for three or more years due to plant or company closing or moving; positions or shifts abolished;
or employer not having enough work for them to do.  The data show that there has been a cyclical decline in the
displacement rate of long-term workers from 3.9 percent in 1991-1992, to 3.3 percent in 1993-1994, to 2.9 percent in
1995-1996. 
One factor which could partly explain higher recipiency rates among older unemployed
workers is that a large share of older UI claimants may be dislocated workers.  In employment policy
and research definitions, dislocated workers are those with long job tenure who become permanently
separated from their employer.
3  Being dislocated increases workers’ chances of eligibility for UI
benefits.  Unfortunately, such circumstances may increase the probability of UI benefit exhaustion.
Relying on data from Hipple (1999a), Table 3 shows that job dislocation increases with age; Farber
(1997) found similar evidence.
4   Table 3 also shows that employment rates decline precipitously after
age 54, and that the prospect of returning to full-time reemployment after displacement is 30 to 70
percent lower for older workers.  Less than one-tenth of displaced workers under 55 years of age
leave the labor force, but more than one-fourth of  workers aged 55-64 and nearly half of those 65
and over exit.  Chan and Stevens (1999) similarly find that involuntary job loss reduces reemployment
chances more for older the job seekers, who often make early transitions to being permanently out
of the labor force—fully retired.  
Unpublished data from the displaced worker survey (Hipple 1999b) reveal that while only 51
percent of all displaced workers received UI, the percentage rises as durations of unemployment
increase.  Three-quarters of displaced workers unemployed five or more weeks received UI, and,
among those unemployed for 15 or more weeks, the proportion rises to four-fifths.  Thus, it appears
that some displaced workers never file for UI benefits, as they search for jobs and become reemployed
quickly: only one-fifth of displaced workers unemployed for less than five weeks collect benefits.
These data also indicate that while the rate of recipiency of UI is stable among age groups around the
mean of 51 percent, exhaustion rates rise sharply with age.
The path of employment and income transition from a career job to retirement income can be
rocky.  As shown in Table 3, displaced workers become reemployed at rapidly declining rates as they
age. Older displaced workers who gain reemployment also suffer larger earnings losses.  Among
displaced workers aged 55 to 64, the earnings loss was 20 percent or more for 38.2 percent of those
who got reemployed, while an earnings reduction of that magnitude was experienced by less than a
quarter of younger displaced workers.  4
5The BAM data are used to assess the accuracy of UI benefit payments by selecting key weeks of benefit
payments.  Beneficiaries who have long durations of UI benefit receipt have a higher probability of being selected for
the weekly BAM samples.  
6U.S. Department of Labor(1999), page 1-1.  
7Blaustein (1993), page 162.  
8Bassi and McMurrer (1997), pages 54-61.  
9The problem of moral hazard is present when the insured can affect the chance of experiencing the
unfavorable outcome insured against, without being observed by the insurer.  In unemployment insurance, moral
hazard is present if a worker can affect the chance of being unemployed while not being detected by the state
unemployment agency.  The state agency will disqualify UI beneficiaries when a job separation or continuing
joblessness is determined to be avoidable.  
For those who do ultimately receive UI benefits, the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM)
audit data provides a picture of their characteristics.
5  Such a summary is provided in Table 4.  Men
tend to draw a larger share of UI benefits, up until age 65.  Older beneficiaries tend to have lower
levels of formal educational attainment.  Beneficiaries over age 54 are less likely to be Black or
Hispanic and more likely to be White or Asian/Pacific islander.  The age distribution of the prior
occupation is different for the oldest workers.  After age 64 larger shares of beneficiaries are from
sales and services occupations, and smaller shares are from structural occupations.  These results are
consistent with a movement into bridge occupations prior to full retirement.  
3.  Coverage
“The coverage provisions of state UI laws determine the employers who are liable for
contributions and the workers who accrue rights under the laws.”
6  Original federal requirements
limited coverage to employers of 8 or more workers in each of 20 or more weeks in a year.
7  UI
coverage today is nearly universal, with only four main exclusions remaining: agricultural workers,
household workers, employees of religious organizations, and the self-employed.
8 
Exclusion of the self-employed is an issue of particular importance to older workers.  Table
5 indicates that 6.8 percent of all non-agricultural workers participate in self-employment, but the
share rises to 10.9 percent of those aged 55 to 64 and to 17.2 percent of those aged 65 and over.  It
is even more important among workers in agriculture, for whom a majority of those 45 years of age
and over are self-employed.   
Since the depression-era beginnings of the federal-state UI program in the United States, the
self-employed have generally not been covered.  The main reason is to avoid problems of moral
hazard.
9  With UI for self-employment, those who would pay premiums and be eligible for benefits
would also manage the risk of unemployment and make decisions about work stoppage.  In particular,
there is an inability to determine whether individuals are involuntarily unemployed, measure the
economic loss of income, and determine whether an individual is employed or unemployed for a given
week.  UI is social insurance and extending coverage to the self-employed compromises the insurance
nature of the program.5
10U.S. Department of Labor (1998).  
11For older workers, an appealing feature of Feldstein and Altman’s (1998) proposal is that borrowing from
the government takes place when accounts are exhausted, and “negative account balances are forgiven at retirement
age.”
12A temporary UI self-employment program was established in 1993 as part of the North American Free Trade
Act (NAFTA).  Federal legislation in 1998 permanently gave states the option to provide self-employment assistance
with UI trust fund money.  
13The eleven states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.  Among these, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have not
yet implemented their programs. 
14Wandner (1992) provides an overview of the international experience.  He also summarizes the two U.S.
experiments which predated the NAFTA authorizing legislation.  
California is the only state that has a limited form of UI coverage for the self-employed. The
California scheme operates on a fully reimbursable basis.  This method of coverage has been used
widely in the UI program first for governmental agencies and since 1972 for private non-profit firms.
In 1998, reimbursable benefits accounted for 5.7 percent of all payments in the federal-state system,
with 42 percent of these reimbursables going to employees separated from non-profits.
10
Reimbursement may not be a particularly effective approach to UI coverage, but it is a method of
avoiding the moral hazard issue by not allowing manipulation of the system for one’s own benefit
(Bassi and McMurrer, 1997).  Under the reimbursable approach, repayment is due in the calendar
quarter following disbursement of benefits.  Such a system would amount to short-term loans to self-
employed for reintegration back to regular wage and salary employment.   Feldstein and Altman
(1998) suggested individual UI savings accounts which could be established with pre-tax
contributions and might be particularly appropriate for the self-employed.
11   
While the UI system is not currently structured to provide temporary income replacement to
the self-employed, in several states UI beneficiaries can start their own business instead of searching
for wage and salary employment.
12  While they establish their self-employment activity they can
receive self-employment assistance (SEA) payments in lieu of UI weekly benefits.  To date, eleven
states have enacted conforming state legislation.
13  
The SEA program, like similar programs in nearly 20 other OECD nations, has been very
small.
14  In 1996, no state had as many as 0.5 percent of its regular UI recipients getting SEA
payments.  SEA participants are generally successful at starting up their own business; about two-
thirds do so.  These participants differ dramatically from other UI claimants.  They are older; less
likely to be a minority (particularly Hispanic); more likely to be from professional, managerial and
technical occupations; have higher educational attainment; and are more likely to be dislocated
workers (Vroman, 1999).
When the U.S. Department of Labor began the SEA experiments in Massachusetts and
Washington in the 1980s, the over representation of older workers was not expected.  Participating
states imagined that the program would be particularly valuable for minorities and women.  It did not6
15About the experiments see Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994); about the programs see Vroman (1999).  
16In many states there is also a requirement that a certain number of hours must have been worked in the
reference period called the base year.  
17Following a 1994 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit case of Pennington versus
Didrickson, many states have implemented alternate benefit year (ABY) rules which consider income and hours the
four most recent calendar quarters if eligibility is not established using the standard rule.  The Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1996, p. 19) endorsed general adoption of ABY rules.  
18Nicholson (1997), page 103.  
19Anderson (1997) examines state rules and practices in administering continuing UI eligibility.   
turn out that way either in the experiments or the early program operations.
15  Rather, older
permanently separated workers have found SEA to be a promising alternative, apparently because
of their greater difficult in finding wage and salary employment and because of skills acquired through
years of employment.
4.  Eligibility—Initial and Continuing
As stated in the introduction to this paper, eligibility for UI benefits depends on recent
earnings experience, the conditions of job separation, and continuing job search activity.  Rules
regarding recent earnings activity call for checking for sufficient prior labor force attachment in UI-
covered work.
16  Essentially these rules ensure that UI premiums have been paid before compensation
is granted.  Earnings are considered for a base period consisting of four calendar quarters, which are
usually the first four of the previous five completed quarters for administrative practicality.
17  Table
1 showed that workers aged 45 and over make up only one-fifth of the unemployed, but they total
more than one-third of all the UI beneficiaries.  This suggests that a high proportion of unemployed
older workers had sufficient prior earnings to qualify for UI benefits.  
The conditions of job separation were set to minimize insurance problems of moral hazard by
essentially ensuring that the separation was involuntary and primarily due to lack of work, not due
to controllable factors such as a quit, a collective bargaining dispute, or discharge for misconduct.
Joblessness is compensable in all states for voluntary separations for good cause which usually
includes (1) sexual harassment, (2) illness, (3) leaving to accept other work, (4) joining the armed
forces, and (5) compulsory retirement.
18  The last of these is of interest to older workers.  As Quinn
(1999) points out, mandatory retirement was outlawed entirely in 1986.  Workers dismissed for
reason of age have been illegally discharged and are therefore entitled to UI benefits, with the
separating employer liable for benefit charges.  
The final requirements for jobless benefits are known as continuing eligibility conditions.
These are set to ensure continuing labor force attachment.  They are of two types: job search
requirements and limits on refusing suitable work.  The job search rules are known as “able, available,
and actively seeking work” requirements.  Administration of these rules is more art than science.
197
Job search requirements are not imposed on beneficiaries who are still waiting to be recalled
by the employer liable for benefit charges.  One of the original aims of UI was to prevent dispersal
of the experienced workers for an enterprise.  Employers may temporarily furlough workers and
promise the employment security agency that the workers will be recalled to their old jobs.  Using
the BAM data, Table 6 summarizes the recall status of UI beneficiaries by age, as well as the age
distribution of various work search requirements.  Workers aged 45 and over are more likely to be
on recall status during their period of UI benefit receipt, and the proportion awaiting recall appears
to increase with age.  Direct data on work search requirements suggest that the rate of job attachment
among UI beneficiaries increases with age, and, as a result, there is a slight downward trend with age
in required work search. 
The UI system was designed to operate for full-time, permanently attached members of the
labor force.  Both initial and continuing UI benefit eligibility issues are raised when part-time
employment is considered.  As seen in Table 7, relative to those aged 25 to 54, part-time work is
popular among both younger and older workers.  For those aged 55 and over, more than one-quarter
of all workers were employed part-time in 1998.  Furthermore, over 30 percent of unemployed job
seekers aged 55 and over were seeking part-time employment.
We now consider two questions concerning part-time work and initial UI eligibility, and then
two different questions about part-time work and continuing eligibility: 
(a) If a part-time job is lost and the job seeker is without work, are prior earnings and hours
sufficient to qualify for benefits?  The crux of this issue is the current use and measurement of
monetary eligibility for UI using a measure of quarterly or annual wages.  Such measures have
traditionally been used by state UI programs to measure labor force attachment.  The Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996) addressed this issue for both part-time and low-
wage workers as well.  States examine earnings and hours in a base period which consists of four
calendar quarters long to see if UI claimants can demonstrate labor force attachment.  In many states,
someone working either half-time at the state average covered wage or full-time at the state minimum
wage would not qualify for UI benefits.  The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(ACUC) (1996, p. 20) recommended that “each state should set its law so that its base period
earnings requirements do not exceed 800 times the state’s minimum hourly wage, and so that its high
quarter earnings requirements do not exceed one-quarter of that amount.”  The intent of the ACUC
was to improve the likelihood that part-time and low-wage workers who work at least 40 percent of
the work year would be able to collect UI.
(b) If two or more part-time jobs were held and one is lost, is there eligibility for UI benefits?
Eligibility is possible in many states, but the answer depends on the level of prior income and current
income.   All states will pay a weekly UI benefit to claimants with sufficient prior earnings if current
weekly income drops to a low but positive level.  Most states have a lump sum earnings disregard.
There are 11 states which have both a disregard and a benefit reduction tax rate on earnings.   8
20O’Leary (1997) found that liberalizing the benefit reduction formula increased earnings reported to the
employment security department, but did not increase work effort.  
In 1994-1995, a field experiment was conducted in Washington state to evaluate whether
liberalizing the benefit reduction formula would increase work effort.
20  The control group of 208,818
UI beneficiaries from that experiment provides some insight into earnings while in claims status by
older workers.  For the control group, under then existing Washington state law, the earnings
disregard was $5 per week and benefits were reduced by 75 percent of weekly earnings above $5.
As shown in Table 8, workers 45 years of age and older tended to have more weeks with a UI
payment and more weeks with reported earnings and a UI payment.  It is interesting to note that this
pattern is most exaggerated for the oldest group of workers—those 65 years of age and over—who
also had a significantly lower average weekly benefit amount.
(c) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job because it is full-time rather
than part-time?  State UI laws would generally disqualify beneficiaries from the receipt of benefits.
The beneficiary would lose eligibility for refusing suitable work, provided that the available job was
in the usual occupation and paid a wage close to that paid for recent similar work.  Thus, the UI
program continues to expect that the norm for labor force participation is full-time employment and
that only job seekers for such jobs should continue to receive UI. 
(d) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job because the hours of work
would conflict with required hours on a currently held part-time job? State rules would suspend UI
benefit eligibility for failing to satisfy the availability requirement for job search.  Current UI eligibility
rules are based on the assumption that people leave full-time work and seek return to full-time work.
Thus, all part-time workers experience severe difficulty when they apply to receive benefits.
Even if they succeed in initially receiving benefits, they are in danger of loss of benefits if they are not
prepared to accept a full-time job.  Since they participate in part-time work at a greater rate than
others, older workers are particularly disadvantaged from receiving UI by these eligibility rules.
 
5.  Adequacy of Benefits
UI provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job seekers who are involuntarily
out of work.  The level of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) is directly related to the prior level of
earnings.  Having a wage-related benefit reinforces the concept that unemployment insurance is an
earned right, based on contributions required by law to be paid by the worker’s employer as
“insurance premiums” against the risk of unemployment.  The wage-related benefit is intended neither
to improve a prior low standard of living nor to support a sumptuous living standard created by a high
income.  Because UI is a social insurance program with the fundamental social aim of preventing
wide-spread poverty, all states impose UI maximum benefit rates to spread benefits as widely as is
practical. 
The adequacy of the weekly benefit amount in performing the income maintenance function
can be gauged by the percentage of lost income which benefits replace—the replacement rate.  Since9
21O’Leary and Rubin (1997), pages 166-169.  
22O’Leary (1998, pp. 66-71) discuss the deficiencies of such aggregate average measures.  
23See the estimates of Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993).  
the beginning of the federal-state UI program in the United States, there has been general acceptance
of the idea that the weekly benefit should replace one-half of the worker’s lost weekly wages.
21  More
broadly, adequacy depends on how well UI benefits help to maintain usual levels of household
expenditure.  We will briefly examine both of these concepts for older workers.  Naturally, the latter
considers all sources of income while out of work including dissaving, pensions, and other household
members.  To understand the role of UI in supporting income security of older workers, it is
important to clearly understand the interaction of pensions and UI.  We give special attention to this
topic.  
As shown in Table 9, the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for UI claimants rises steadily with
age up until age 65.  While the WBA averaged $202 in 1998 across all age groups, it averaged only
$157 for workers aged less than or equal to 24 and reached $216 for workers aged 55 to 64.  The
average WBA for workers 65 and over was only $174.  The decline for these oldest workers most
likely is related to the fact that workers aged 65 and over often move into lower wage “bridge
employment” as they near full retirement age (Quinn, 1999).   As shown in Table 9, the normal hourly
wage for the 65 and over group is appreciably lower than that for the 55 to 64 age cohort.  This dip
translates into a dip in the base period wage rate, since base period weeks worked are on a par with
younger age groups. 
A common summary measure of UI benefit adequacy is the wage replacement ratio.  While
this gross average ratio of mean WBA to mean weekly earnings is a crude measure of adequacy with
well documented deficiencies, it is a commonly used measure.
22  By this measure Table 9 suggests
that UI wage replacement tends to decline with age until after age 64.  Meeting the UI benefit
adequacy standard of one-half wage replacement may actually mean beneficiaries are receiving more
than half of potential future wages.  This is most likely true for displaced workers, who gain
reemployment at average wages 20 percent below prior levels and suffer greater wage reductions if
they are forced to find work in a new industry or occupation.
23   Even if not displaced, it may be true
for many older workers who voluntarily seek bridge employment after job separation later in their
careers.  Quinn (1999) points out that bridge employment is usually for fewer hours if in the same
occupation and for lower wages if in a different occupation than the career job.  
Receipt of pension income had no effect on weekly UI benefit payments until federal rules
applied for special extended benefits authorized during the 1961 recession.  In response to these
recessionary rules, the states experimented with alternative treatment of pension income by UI
beneficiaries.  Merrill Murray (1967) investigated the question, Should pensioners receive
unemployment compensation? based on a collection of 12 state studies of practices and effects.  He
argued that there should be no reduction in UI benefits because of pension receipt, that UI is social
insurance based on prior work experience which should be paid with dignity and dispatch to eligible
claimants with no means test applied.  Furthermore, he asserted that the state studies showed10
pensioners who were UI beneficiaries were not becoming wealthy from “double dipping.”  He wrote
that, “the chief reason that pensioners work or seek work is economic necessity.  Pensions are, in
most instances, insufficient to provide even a modest but adequate income” (Murray 1967, p. 37).
Nonetheless, 1976 federal UI amendments (Public Law 94-566) required a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of UI payments against “any governmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay,
annuity, or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the previous work of such
individual.”  (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 4-19)  The rule applies only to payments from plans
established by the base period or UI chargeable employer.  States may disregard pension income if
established by other than a base period employer, except that Social Security and Railroad Retirement
benefits reduce UI dollar-for-dollar regardless of when entitlement was established.  Also, states are
permitted to reduce UI by less than each dollar of pension income if an employee’s own contributions
helped establish the pension benefit.
Currently, among the 53 state UI programs, 38 pro-rate UI benefit reductions for employee
contributions to pension plans, and 28 states disregard benefits received from pensions established
outside of the base period.  In recent years, states have experienced administrative difficulty when
pension accumulations in employer-established defined contribution plans (401k) are rolled over into
individual retirement accounts (IRA).  Since the IRA may have been previously established with direct
personal contributions, the state faces a complex problem determining the proportion of IRA
distributions to disregard.  The problem is further complicated when it is recognized that 401k type
funds may include both employer and employee contributions.  
To understand the importance of UI in maintaining living standards for older workers consider
the percentage of aged household units with income from various sources.  Table 10 shows that the
proportion having income from earnings declines with age.  For the three age groups 55 to 61, 62 to
64, and 65 plus, the respective percentages with earnings were 80, 63, and 21; conversely for the
same three groups, the percentages with retirement income were 27, 63 and 93, respectively.  A
uniform 61 to 63 percent had asset income, and a uniform 6 percent had income from public
assistance.  UI benefits were received by 6 percent of the 55 to 61 year old group, by 3 percent of
those 62 to 64, and by only 1 percent of those 65 or over.  Table 11 considers the same three age
groups and reports that the majority of aggregate income comes from earnings and retirement
benefits, with the latter most important for the oldest group.  The bulk of remaining income is
provided from assets, less than one percent from public assistance and approximately 2 percent from
other sources including personal contributions and UI.  
Only a small fraction of older citizens receive UI, and in total it amounts to a small proportion
of their aggregate income.  An important question regards the role of UI in maintaining living
standards for older workers who do receive UI.  Would their economic position be dramatically
altered if UI benefits were not provided?  These questions were exhaustively examined by Daniel
Hamermesh.  The following are some of his main findings which anticipate effects of the 1976 UI
reforms (Hamermesh 1980, pp. 83-84).11
24A thorough discussion of these matters is provided by O’Leary and Rubin (1997, pp. 194-199).
25The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996) recommended a  federal standard requiring
the maximum weekly benefit amount to equal two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage, so as to would allow
a majority of covered workers to receive at least 50 percent wage replacement.  
26A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the minimum “be related to the weekly wages of
the lowest wage group in the state for which the unemployment insurance program is considered appropriate” (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1962).  
• Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of income among older
workers compared to what it would be in the absence of UI benefit payments.
• Dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI for receipt of private or public pension
income would reduce UI payments by more than 25 percent among workers
aged 59-64 and by over 40 percent among workers aged 61 to 66.  Because
older Americans generally have lower incomes, this increases the income gap
between older workers and others.  
• Within the population of households headed by older workers, instituting the
pension offset will increase income equality.  This is because the majority of
those receiving both pension an UI benefits are in the upper deciles of the
income distribution for the older population.  These households also have a
greater ability to maintain consumption during periods of unemployment.
• Among older UI recipients, about half have access to past savings or
borrowing in sufficient amounts such that the pension offset would not cause
hardship.  Families without the capacity to borrow when the head is
unemployed cut back mostly on consumption of luxury goods.  
• The availability of UI benefits neither induces older workers to remain in the
labor force, nor does it facilitate quicker exit from the labor force.  However,
UI functions as an income transfer to workers who have made the decision to
retire.  
The social insurance aspect of UI explains the presence of maximum and minimum weekly
benefit amounts (WBAs).
24  States impose maximum WBAs because the aim is to prevent widespread
descent into poverty, not to perfectly smooth consumption for high wage earners.
25  The minimum
WBA is probably of more concern to older workers, many of whom are involved in part-time and
low-wage work.  WBA minimums are set in part to relieve the administrative burden of processing
weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount, but the minimum WBA often replaces more
than half of lost wages because of the social adequacy requirement to provide at least a modicum of
cash income.
26  If UI system changes to broaden recipiency by low-wage and part-time workers are
considered, investigation of minimum WBA policy is needed.  12
27Both Massachusetts and Washington offer regular benefit durations as long as 30 weeks.  Woodbury and
Rubin (1997) provides an exhaustive review and critique of UI extended benefit programs.  
28The Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data measures the duration of benefits from the beginning date
of a worker’s benefit year—the date at which they established their eligibility for benefits—until the date when that
worker’s claim was investigated (the “key week”).  
29These duration estimates underestimate claimant duration because the data is censored, since they represent
the claimant’s benefit history up until the BAM key week is selected but not after.
30Blackwell, Okba, and Casey (1995, p. 84).  
31In Hungary the unemployment compensation financing system partially subsidized early retirement
payments for surplus workers in struggling enterprises, and fully paid such benefits when the enterprise was bankrupt
(O’Leary 1995, p. 732).  
32Australia in 1987, Belgium in 1985, and New Zealand in 1992 either eliminated or greatly relaxed the work
search requirement for older unemployment compensation beneficiaries (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey, 1995, p. 85).
6.  Duration of Benefits
In the absence of severe economic conditions which trigger benefit payments of extended
duration, the maximum entitled duration of UI benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states.
27  Table 12
indicates that the average duration of benefit receipt tends to increase steadily as workers get older.
Based on the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, the average duration of benefits across
all age groups is 15.9 weeks, with the average duration increasing steadily with age.
28  Benefit
durations for workers 24 years of age or less averaged 14.7 weeks.  The average duration increased
with each age group and reached 16.7 weeks for workers 65 years of age or older.
29
In recent years, some countries experiencing severe labor surplus conditions have added a
feature to unemployment compensation which is targeted to older workers and is intended to provide
income payments as a to bridge private and/or public pension income receipt.  In 1976, the
Netherlands began paying benefits through age 65 to persons exhausting regular entitlement at age
60 or over; in 1981, the U.K. extended the duration and increased the benefit rate for long- term
recipients aged 60 and over; in the mid 1980s, Germany increased the maximum duration of benefits
from 12 to 32 months for those aged 54 and over.
30  Such early retirement uses of unemployment
compensation also became a popular tool for supporting the transition to a competitive labor market
in the formerly planned economies of eastern and central Europe.  For example, in Hungary where
full public pension payments may begin at age 60 for men and 55 for women, beginning in 1991 early
retirement unemployment compensation payments were offered at even younger ages.
31  Within the
past 15 years, additional countries have relaxed work search rules for older workers, thereby
permitting longer benefit durations.
32   
Given the tight labor market conditions in the United States near the end of the twentieth
century, it is unlikely that UI program features intended to remove workers from the labor force will
be considered in the near future.  The pattern of full- and part-time work by older UI beneficiaries
suggests a desire for prolonged labor force attachment and greater flexibility in choosing employment13
33Lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by one week is estimated to lengthen joblessness by between
0.1 and 0.5 weeks, while a 10 percent increase in the wage replacement rate is estimated to increase the joblessness
by between 0.3 and 1.5 weeks.  
34Burgess and Kingston (1987, p. 235), cite “difficulty in monitoring claimant compliance with weekly
eligibility criteria” as a prime cause for UI payment errors associated with the work test.  
and income sources.  In addition to recognizing the importance of work transitions between career
and bridge jobs and from bridge jobs to full retirement, switches between bridge jobs should be
accommodated.  Flexibility in UI benefit duration, wage replacement, initial entitlement, and
continuing entitlement are all elements in shaping a decision context to encourage continued labor
market involvement by older workers.  
7.  Work Incentives
In providing partial wage replacement, the UI system has the potential of prolonging spells
of unemployment.  Several economists following Feldstein (1974) have reported evidence suggesting
that UI lengthens jobless spells beyond what would occur in the absence of UI compensation.  Decker
(1997) summarizes estimates of how the entitled duration of benefits and the rate of wage
replacement affect the length of joblessness.
33  None of the previous research has reported how these
effects of UI vary by age.  
Two opposite solutions have been tried to solve this principal-agent work incentive problem.
Traditional policy has been to monitor work search, while positive reemployment incentives were
evaluated through field experiments in the 1980s. 
To ensure continuing labor force attachment by beneficiaries and to guard against avoidable
joblessness, work search requirements have been part of continuing eligibility rules since the inception
of UI.  In terms of carrot-and-stick incentives, work search rules represent the stick.  Stringency and
enforcement of such rules has varied greatly across the states, and the majority of benefit
overpayment errors have been traced to improper application of work search rules.
34  Work search
rules of varying stringency were evaluated in a field experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington,
in 1986-1987.  Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994) found that eliminating the work test would
greatly lengthen the duration of UI benefit receipt.  They also found that requiring attendance at a job
search workshop four weeks after the claim and an in- person eligibility review interview halfway
through the entitled duration of benefits would measurably reduce UI benefit receipt.  A subgroup
analysis of impacts by age found that those under 25 and those 55 and over behaved similarly to each
other and modestly different from other age groups.  Both groups increased UI receipt by the most
of all age groups when the work search test was relaxed (about 3.3 weeks more for both groups), and
reduced UI receipt by the least of all age groups when the work test was strengthened (about –0.4
weeks for both groups).  The work test appears to be particularly effective in changing the work
search behavior of older workers.  
In the 1980s, inadequate forward financing of UI benefits, combined with political efforts to
restrain tax increases, led to the exploration of new means for dealing with work disincentive14
35Impact analyses by age for the Pennsylvania experiment are reported by Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and
Kerachsky (1992, p. 111), while those for Washington are reported by Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Klein (1992, p. 127).
36Decker and O’Leary (1992, p. 54) report impact estimates by age group for a pooled Pennsylvania and
Washington sample while controlling for the interaction of age with other factors.  
37Recent research suggests that when a low bonus amount with a long benefit duration is targeted to those
most likely to exhaust benefits (displaced workers), it appears to be cost effective (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner,
1998).  
38These arguments are developed more completely by Blaustein, O’Leary and Wandner (1997, pp 11-17). 
39Employees make small direct contributions in Alaska, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, but it has been
estimated by Anderson and Meyer (1995) that employer UI taxes are partly paid by workers who contribute to the
system by accepting lower wages.  
40Principles of experience rating UI taxes are explained in Tannenwald and O’Leary (1997).  Estimates of
the degree of experience rating across states are provided by Tannenwald, O’Leary, and Huang (1999).  
problems while retaining the income maintenance function of UI.  A variety of new initiatives were
tested as field experiments, with the UI reemployment bonus gaining considerable attention.
Decker and O’Leary (1992, 1995) examined the effect of offering cash bonus payments to UI
beneficiaries who return to work quickly in Pennsylvania and Washington.  Across the two
experiments, the average bonus offer of about 4 weeks of benefits for return to work within about
10 weeks shortened UI benefit receipt by just under half a week.  
A subgroup analysis by age for the Pennsylvania experiment suggested that the bonus impact
decreased with age, with virtually no impact on those over age 55; the Washington results suggested
a generally opposite pattern, with older beneficiaries responding more strongly.
35  However, in
Washington, workers aged over 45 had an appreciably smaller response to biggest bonus offer, which
had the largest overall effects.  In a pooled analysis of Pennsylvania and Washington data, bonus
impacts were virtually identical across the three age groups: under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 plus.
36  Age
is neither a legal nor an effective characteristic on which to target reemployment bonus offers;
however, recent research suggests that bonus offers targeted to those most likely to exhaust benefits
may be more cost effective.
37  
8.  Financing  Benefits and Potential New Legislation
UI is social insurance;.it is neither private insurance nor social welfare.
38  Social insurance
embodies incentive aspects found in private insurance contracts and eligibility and benefit features
required by considerations of social adequacy.  Key features which distinguish UI as insurance are
related to the financing provisions.  UI benefits are financed by employers through experience-rated
payroll taxes.
39  Experience rating means that employer UI tax rates increase with their experience
in laying off workers who subsequently draw UI benefits.
40  15
41The Netherlands and Poland have considered adopting experience rating of unemployment compensation
taxes.  Countries outside of the U.S. often levy employer and employee contributions with rates set on a socialized basis
to cover recent benefit payments.  Unemployment compensation payments often are subsidized by central government
general revenues, occasionally this is the only source of financing.   
42Blaustein (1993), p. 47, from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Employment Security in 1955. 
43For example, when an employer’s UI tax rate is at the maximum of the range, additional UI benefit charges
do not change the tax rate on wages.  Tannenwald and O’Leary (1997) explain that in such circumstances subsidies
flow from other employers.  
44West and Hildebrand (1997, p. 575).
When the federal-state UI system was established as part of the Social Security Act of 1935,
the experience rating of employer UI taxes greatly helped make the program acceptable to employers.
It was reasoned that allocating benefit costs to businesses responsible for unemployment benefit
claims would make UI consistent with the free market system.  The costs of the goods and services
produced by insured workers would thus reflect the costs of any UI benefits paid to them.  
Experience rating results in employer involvement in initial eligibility determination and
reduces the risk of moral hazard.  The United States is the only nation in the world which finances
unemployment compensation benefits with experience-rated taxes.
41  It is the main cause of business-
labor involvement in the system, but experience rating ensures that UI will not become a dole on a
par with social assistance.  No stigma attaches to the receipt of UI, “which provides compensation
for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and despatch.”
42  
Limitations of state UI tax systems mean that benefits are not always completely charged back
to prior employers.  Tannenwald and O’Leary (1997) identified a number of factors which interrupt
the operation of perfect experience rating: maximum and minimum tax rates, limits on the taxable
payroll, time lags, and exclusions.
43  The exclusions include state contributions to extended benefits,
benefits paid to former employees of bankrupt firms, and dependents allowances.  Benefit payments
which are not charged back to prior employers are said to be socialized.  They are paid for by tax
features which are usually not experience-rated, but instead collected as a fixed percentage of the
taxable payrolls at UI covered employers.   
For 65 years, the experience rated UI tax system has operated to finance hundreds of billions
of dollars in UI benefits.  Except for occasional and temporary loans to the states, the basic system
has operated independent of general tax revenues. The federal-state UI system currently holds in
excess of $50 billion in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) and has annual revenues and benefit
payments of about $20 billion (U.S. Department of Labor, 1999).  Since the Unified Budget Act
(UBA) of 1969, money held in the UTF is accounted for in the annual budget of the United States
government.
44  From the time of UBA enactment through 1997, the federal government experienced
annual budget deficits; in these years, the UTF surplus was hoarded to improve federal unified budget
reports.  The current federal government budget surplus and projections for future surplus budgets
have raised policy interest in expanded uses of UTF money.  16
45These and related issues are discussed in a broader context by O’Leary and Wandner (1997, pp. 714-716).
Other policies to increase UI recipiency such as broadening coverage to seasonal and employees of small farms are to
a lesser degree important to older workers, but could also be financed within the experience rating framework.  
46The proposed rule for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation allows states to determine whether
the benefits would be experience rated or socialized.  Federal Register, volume 64, number 232, pages 67971-67979.
Pear (1999) describes the political dispute over President Clinton’s plan to pay cash benefits to those on parental leave
from the unemployment trust fund.
A particular policy concern of the Clinton administration has been the decline in the ratio of
the insured to total unemployment rate (IUR/TUR), that is, the decline in the recipiency ratio.  This
decline threatens both the aggregate adequacy of income replacement and the built-in stabilizer
function of the UI benefit system for the macro-economy.  
We have recognized that displaced older workers have difficulty gaining reemployment at
wages which match their career jobs, and that voluntary transition from career jobs is often done
gradually by a shift to part-time work on the career job, or to a bridge job which usually pays
substantially less per hour of work.   Late in life, workers make transitions from career jobs to bridge
jobs, between bridge jobs, sometimes back to career jobs, and eventually to full retirement with
income from pensions and assets.  What improvements in the federal-state UI system would best
facilitate these transitions, and what would be their financing implications?
Changes in UI eligibility rules to accommodate workers in low-wage labor markets and
workers with preferences for part-time work could be financed within the current experience rating
framework.
45  As recommended by the ACUC (1996), permitting initial eligibility for those working
800 hours in the base period, regardless of  base period wages, would benefit the low wage group.
Changing continuing eligibility requirements concerning “refusal of suitable work” to include not only
customary wage and occupation, but also customary hours per week, is a practical solution.  These
expansions would impose UI tax cost increases on employers in low- wage industries such as retail
and hospitality, who customarily pay UI taxes at the minimum rate.  However, such increases would
be shared in part by employees through moderation in wage increases, and subsidies flowing from
these industries to high-wage high lay-off industries such as construction and manufacturing would
diminish.   
Some other UI-related policy accommodations to older workers, which may be tempting
given federal budget surplus projections and the aim of broadening UI recipiency, would most
certainly be financed from socialized rather than experience-rated taxes.  Dependents allowances are
financed by socialized taxes because they stretch the social insurance standard which sets a weekly
maximum on partial income replacement because of the aim to prevent decent into poverty.  While
not relevant to older workers, in the spring of 1999, President Clinton announced his desire to use
the UI system to provide “Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation.”  Such a program
would most certainly be financed by socialized UI taxes.
46  A similar financing scheme would be most
natural for extensions of UI more relevant to older workers, such as paying health insurance17
47In 1995 President Clinton “mentioned finding some way to help workers who lose their jobs keep their
health insurance while they look for work.  Under federal law they can continue their policy for a year and a half by
paying 102 percent of the combined employer-employee premium, but many cannot afford to do so.  Clinton favors
some form of subsidy to help them” (Rich, 1995)  On December 17, 1999, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentive
Improvement Act (Public Law 106-170) was enacted; it allows the extension of Medicare for those on Social Security
Disability Insurance and Medicaid for those on Social Security Income after recipients earnings rise above a given
level.  
48Burgess and Kingston (1987) identify the work test as a main source of UI overpayments, citing the
complexity of the ES-UI monitoring as part of the problem.  
premiums for the unemployed or providing early retirement unemployment compensation payments
to support transition to pension income.
47  
9.  Interaction with other Employment Programs
While discussing the adequacy of UI for older workers, we described the interaction between
UI and Social Security retirement payments—federal law requires that UI benefits be reduced by one
dollar for each dollar of Social Security benefits received.  In this penultimate section of the paper
we examine UI interactions with other employment programs which may be of relevance for older
workers.  
The strongest linkage between UI and Employment Service (ES) programs is provided
through the work test for continuing UI eligibility.  Many state UI laws require registration with and
active use of ES services to maintain established UI benefit entitlement.  For a variety of reasons,
including the fact that UI payment errors have often been due to improper application of statutory
work search rules, many states have relaxed their work test.
48  These changes have weakened the link
between UI and ES.
The UI-ES linkage was renewed and strengthened in 1993 by federal legislation creating the
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system.  The legislation required states to
establish procedures for early identification of UI beneficiaries likely to exhaust their UI benefit
entitlement and to refer these persons quickly to special reemployment services. State UI and ES
agencies were identified as key partners in the WPRS, and Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
service delivery agencies were encouraged to cooperate and provide reemployment services,
particularly for their Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance  (EDWAA) Act
clients.   
Most states choose to implement the WPRS system using a statistical profiling model.  The
U.S. Department of Labor developed a prototype statistical model and provided training to the states
in how to adapt principles of the prototype for their own uses.  To examine the model sensitivity, the
preliminary prototype prepared by the U.S. Department of Labor included an age variable to help
predict the likelihood of UI benefit exhaustion.  This variable and certain others, however, are
prohibited by federal civil rights legislation and were excluded from the final model recommended by
the Department of Labor.  Nonetheless, an analysis was conducted to determine the impact of18
49Based on state UI Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for 1998.  
dropping the prohibited variables.  In the case of age, it was found that even though age was a
significant variable, the effect of the age variable was largely accounted for by the variable tenure on
the prior job, which was adopted in the final model (Wandner, 1998).  
Table 13 presents predicted and actual UI benefit exhaustion rates by age group, computed
on a sample of beneficiaries drawn in Michigan before the WPRS was implemented.  This sample was
used to estimate the Michigan WPRS profiling model (Eberts and O’Leary, 1996).  Because of the
civil rights prohibition, age was not included in the logit models estimated to predict UI benefit
exhaustion in Michigan.  The table shows that the actual UI exhaustion rate for beneficiaries aged 65
and over is appreciably higher than for other age groups and that the Michigan model predicts a
modestly higher exhaustion rate for that group.  However, the actual exhaustion rate for all the age
groups less than 65 is nearly uniform, ranging between 21 and 25 percent.  The Michigan profiling
model was estimated using non-linear methods and predicts the likelihood of exhaustion to increase
exponentially with age.  This pattern was most likely captured by the tenure variable.  The model
indirectly identifies those permanently separated from their employer and industry, because they are
likely to be long-term UI beneficiaries.  Research by Chan and Stevens (1999) and others suggests
that unemployed older workers have a greater risk of prolonged jobless spells.  Data is not available
on the age distribution of those referred to WPRS job search workshops, but it is likely to include
older workers in high proportion to their numbers in UI benefit receipt.  It should be mentioned that
both program staff and participants have responded very positively to the special services given those
profiled and referred by the WPRS system (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer, 1999).  
In addition to the WPRS system, several other global changes are now changing the way that
UI interacts with other employment programs and the way that clients interact with UI.  The local
administration of UI is rapidly changing from in-person interviews to taking claims by telephone.  The
new telephone systems are being used for the filing of both new initial claims and continuing claims.
Less and less do unemployed workers wait in line at a UI claims center.  Unless older workers are
either called in to attend a job search workshop because of the WPRS or called to attend an eligibility
review interview to review their job search efforts and plans, they may never enter a physical location
for UI services.  By 1998, half or more of continued claims  in 35 states were taken by telephone (24
states took more than three-quarters of these claims by telephone).  Furthermore, 11 states took
about half or more of their initial claims by telephone.
49  This move to telephone claims is now
accelerating.  
Sweeping change in the public reemployment services landscape is coming soon because of
requirements of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998.  This law requires that public One-
Stop Career Centers be established in local areas to deliver a coordinated package of reemployment
services including UI, ES, skill retraining and referral to other employment programs.  While UI is
a required partner at one-stop career centers, the trend toward telephone claims suggests that it may
be present simply as a telephone on the wall over which UI claims can be made.  19
50WIA section 121(b)(1)(B)(vi).  
51A training and technical assistance guide has been developed for providing special services for older workers
under the Workforce Investment Act.  
By July 2000, when WIA becomes operational nationally, an older worker reaching a One-
Stop Career Center in most areas will find a different mix of training and employment services than
has been offered under JTPA.  Under WIA, there is a more structured approach to the provision of
services.  It is expected that all individuals first entering a One-Stop Career Center will first be offered
core services that will consist of self-service and modest staff-assisted services.  Only if these core
services do not suffice will the individual be offered intensive services which will involve greater staff
assistance.  Skill training will be offered only after other avenues to employment have been exhausted.
It is expected that training will be provided to a smaller proportion of clients than under JTPA. 
Under JTPA, most of the services received by older workers were from two special programs:
Senior Community Service Employment Program and Services for Older Workers (JTPA Title II,
Section 204(D)).  Older workers usually did not participate in regular JTPA programs for
disadvantaged adults.  Older workers were greatly under represented in their receipt of service under
the program for disadvantaged adults (Title IIA).   Workers 45 years of age and over amounted to
about 45 percent of the eligible population in Program Year 1995, however, those 45 and over
received only 13 percent of services.  Notably, those aged 55 and over received only 2 percent.  For
the dislocated worker program (Title III), workers 45 years of age and over were proportionally
represented, being about one-third of both the eligible and service receiving populations (Poulos and
Nightengale, 1997).
The aim of new One-Stop Career Centers under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) is to
attempt to serve all workers who seek assistance.  No single group is targeted for services under
WIA; instead, a wide variety of services can be accessed by all workers.  
Under the JTPA program, services for older workers were specified under Section 204(D),
and section 202(c)(1)(D) required that 5 percent of the federal allocation to states had to be used for
these older worker services.  No similar provision exists under the WIA to differentiate older workers
from other adults.  On the other hand, in the establishment of the one-stop delivery system under
WIA, there are a number of required partners and programs.  Some activities provided by the Older
Americans Act of 1965 are part of the required partnerships.
50  The result is that older workers will
have certain activities available under WIA, but these activities will not have special funding.  Older
workers will be treated differently, but they will be subject to same funding constraints and have the
same availability of services as any other adult worker when entering a One-Stop Career Center.
51
There is a separate employment program funded by the federal government for older workers.
The Senior Community Service Program provides part-time employment, at least 20 hours per week,
in community service activities for older workers.  This program is funded by an annual federal
appropriation.  Strong Congressional support has resulted in a stable funding level for this program
in recent years.  Congress appropriated $440.2 million for the program in the 1998 and 1999 fiscal20
year budgets and has appropriated the same amount for the upcoming year, which will be the first
year of full operation under WIA.  
10.  Topics for Future Policy Analysis and Research
In studying economic security for older workers, considerable attention should be given to
unemployment insurance (UI) as a source of income security and as a potential influence on work
incentives.  Current policy reviews, such as the one by the Committee for Economic Development
(1999), which have explored how the private sector can make better use of older workers in the labor
force, consider the impact of governmental policy with respect to Social Security and Medicare on
older workers, but they do not address the important role of  UI.  
Previous policy analysis and research which does examine UI and older workers has tended
to be based on an earlier and more simplistic model.  It was a model of a single transition near the end
of the working life: a one-step move from full-time work in a career job to full retirement.  That
model is rapidly being replaced by one involving a chain of employment transitions: from career job
to bridge job, between bridge jobs,  perhaps back from a bridge job to a career job, and finally a
gradual movement into to full retirement while out of the labor force.  
New research should address how UI influences the choice and timing of the wide variety of
labor market transitions which happen in the second half of the working life.  Many older workers
are already electing to work rather than retire and to remain in their current communities rather than
to move to retirement communities.  This trend is likely to continue strongly in the future.  In
particular, the role of part-time work and self-employment are likely to be very important the future.
A recent survey sponsored by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) found that four-
fifths of all workers born between 1946 and 1964, the “baby-boomers,” intend to continue working
after retirement: 58 percent in part-time employment; 5 percent in full time employment “doing
something different;” and 17 percent in self employment  (Roper-Starch, 1999).  
Demographic patterns in United States labor markets at the end of the twentieth century
suggest that it would be wise to investigate and develop policies to encourage the continued labor
market participation of older workers.  Employer groups are increasingly concerned about
maintaining labor market participation of older workers, given the smaller cohorts that will follow.
They want the supply of skilled labor that older workers embody available for productive use.  The
new study by the Committee on Economic Development (1999), entitled “New Opportunities for
Older Workers,” is really about what employers and, to a lesser extent, government can do to retain
and hire older workers.  This study seems to focus more on the basic decision to work or not, rather
than the ongoing decisions that older workers continually need to make about what type of
employment to pursue and what to do if a given job ends.  More attention needs to be paid to the
impact of UI as a source of income and as an influence on work incentives for older workers.  
Changes in UI  rules concerning initial eligibility, continuing eligibility, wage replacement, and
partial benefits should all be examined to evaluate effects on the likely employment patterns of older21
workers.  Particular attention should be given to UI features affecting the choice of self-employment,
part-time work, seasonal work, and agricultural jobs.  
The financing consequences of  possible UI program changes should also be estimated, as
should the macroeconomic impact of broadening recipiency.  UI program features which would
promote flexible and extended labor force participation by older workers, should also enrich the
employment choice environment for other workers.  Therefore, it would be useful to examine the
impact of such program changes on UI as a built in stabilizer of aggregate expenditure.  
The UI program has an impact on whether workers choose to work or to enjoy leisure.  The
potential impact of policy change in the areas outlined, would probably have a greater impact on the
behavior of older workers than on younger workers who are strongly attached to the labor force.  As
our society tries to retain older workers in the labor force, we need to look closely at the current and
potential role of UI.  22
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Table 1. Labor Force and Unemployment Concepts by Age for the United States, 1998
Total <=24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Labor force
1
(thousands) 137,673 21,939 32,813 37,536 28,368 13,215 3,847
Percent of the labor force 15.9 23.8 27.3 20.6 9.6 2.8
Total unemployed
2
(thousands) 6,210 2,286 1,419 1,258 782 343 122
Percent of total unemployed 36.8 22.9 20.3 12.6 5.5 2.0
Percent of insured
unemployed
3 8.9 25.8 29.6 20.6 10.9 2.5
1 Data from the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics, Third Edition, 1999, Table 1-6.
2 Data from the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics, Third Edition, 1999, Table 1-26.
3 Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of  Labor, UI Service.  Age information not available for 1.8 percent 
of beneficiaries.  29
Table 2. Age Distribution of the Insured Unemployed in the United States, 1998
Total <=24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65 INA






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Unpublished U.S. Department of Labor  data on claims filed for UI in the week including the 12
th of each
month. 30
Table 3. Long-Tenured Displaced Workers, 1995-1996 (%)
Age Groups
20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Displacement rates 1.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.5
Employment status in February 1998:
Employed a 88.5 89.0 87.2 63.6 47.2
Unemployed a 2.5 4.2 5.3 7.7 5.5
Not in labor force a 8.6 6.7 7.5 28.8 47.3
Among the displaced:
Reemployed full-time 60.0 74.6 74.9 56.0 47.8 20.7
Among those reemployed full time,
the percent experiencing an
earnings loss of 20 percent or more
a 24.6 23.8 24.5 38.2 a
UI recipiency rate 0.30 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.53
b
UI exhaustion rate 0.19 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.70
b
a Percentage not reported where the base is less than 75,000.  
b Values for age 55 and over.
Source: Hipple(1999a) first 6 rows;  Hipple(1999b) last two rows.31
Table 4. Percentage Distribution by Age of UI Beneficiary Characteristics in the U.S.,
1998
Age Groups
Total <=24 25-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Citizenship













































































































































































































































Source: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S .Department of
Labor.32
Table 5. Employed and Self-employed by Age in the United States, 1998
Total <=24 25-34   35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Employment
Total 131,463 19,611 31,395 36,278 27,587 12,873 3,725
Non-agriculture 128,084 19,009 30,677 35,486 26,991 12,477 3,448
Wage and salary 119,019 18,694 29,146 32,750 24,565 11,066 2,800
Self-employment 8,962 299 1,513 2,710 2,403 1,399 639
Non-paid family 103 16 18 26 23 12 9
Agriculture 3,379 602 718 792 596 396 277
 Wage and salary 2,000 519 531 473 275 149 53
 Self-employment 1,341 64 179 314 319 245 221
 Non-paid family 38 19 8 5 2 2 3
Share of total employment in group (%)
Non-agriculture 97.4 96.9 97.7 97.8 97.8 96.9 92.6
 Wage and salary 90.5 95.3 92.8 90.3 89.0 86.0 75.2
 Self-employment 6.8 1.5 4.8 7.5 8.7 10.9 17.2
 Non-paid family 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Agriculture 2.6 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.2 3.1 7.4
 Wage and salary 1.5 2.6 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.4
 Self-employment 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.9 5.9
 Non-paid family 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Source: Employment and Earnings, Volume 46, Number 1, January 1999, Table 15. 33
Table 6. Return-to-Work Issues for UI Beneficiaries
Age Groups
Total <=24 25-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Recall Status
No recall 65.0 63.2 66.1 64.8 62.5 56.3
Definite recall 9.7 6.7 9.5 10.3 11.1 13.8
Indefinite recall 20.4 24.8 19.4 20.5 21.0 24.4
N/A (partial) 4.9 5.3 5.0 4.4 5.4 5.5
Work Search Requirement
No WS requirement 9.3 11.0 9.1 8.8 9.7 10.0
WS required 70.0 71.4 70.4 69.6 68.3 68.2
WS temporarily suspended 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.3
Union deferral 5.0 2.2 4.6 6.4 6.2 3.0
Job attached 12.8 11.1 12.7 12.6 13.6 17.2
Other deferral 2.0 3.2 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.2
Registered with a private
employment agency 4.0 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.4 1.6
Source:  Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of
Labor.  34
Table 7. Employed and Unemployed Full-time  and Part-time by Age in the United
States, 1998
Age Groups
Total <=24 25-54 >=55
Total employment 131,463 19,611 95,259 16,597
  Full-time 108,202 11,593 84,274 12,336
  Part-time 23,261 8,016 10,985 4,261
Total unemployment 6,209 2,286 3,459 464
  Seeking full-time work 4,916 1,494 3,097 325
  Seeking part-time work 1,293 792 362 139
Percent of Total Employment
  Full-time 82.3 59.1 88.5 74.3
  Part-time 17.7 40.9 11.5 25.7
Percent of Total Unemployment
  Seeking full-time work 79.2 65.4 89.5 70.0
  Seeking part-time work 20.8 34.6 10.5 30.0
 Source: Employment and Earnings, Volume 46, Number 1, January 1999, Table 8.  35
Table 8. Part-time Earnings and UI benefits in Washington State, 1994-95
Mean <=24 25-34  35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Earnings when on UI claim 1,218 443 967 1,485 1,766 1,853 1,133
UI amount received ($)  2,731 1,583 2,596 3,050 3,316 3,320 2,724
UI when  earning ($) 184 96 167 212 233 230 196
UI when not earning ($) 2,547 1,486 2,429 2,839 3,083 3,090 2,529
Percent of UI dollars
 When earning 6.7 6.1 6.4 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.2
 When not earning 93.3 93.9 93.6 93.1 93.0 93.1 92.8
Weeks with UI receipt 13.4 10.2 13.0 14.1 15.0 15.9 17.6
Weeks UI when earning 1.8 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.7
Weeks UI when no earning 11.7 9.1 11.4 12.2 12.8 13.5 14.9
Percent of weeks with UI
When earning 13.1 10.9 12.1 13.7 14.6 14.9 15.3
When not earning 86.9 89.0 87.9 86.3 85.5 85.1 84.7
Weekly Benefit Amount ($) 214 154 210 234 239 235 169
Base Period Earnings ($) 17,110 10,357 15,878 19,419 20,876 20,873 13,585
High Quarter Earnings ($) 6,237 4,005 5,833 7,006 7,496 7,427 4,917
Sample Size 32,176 69,216 58,367 33,429 13,655 1,97536
Table 9. Benefit and Earnings Measures for UI Beneficiaries in the US, 1998
Age Groups
Total <=24  25-4 45-54 55-64 >=65 
Weekly benefit amount (WBA) ($) 202 157 201 215 216 174
Normal hourly wage ($) 12.14 8.69 11.72 13.76 13.68 11.50
Lowest acceptable hourly wage
 (reservation wage) ($)
10.28 7.38 9.96 11.48 11.55 10.17
Reservation wage/normal wage (%) 88.0 90.1 88.2 86.5 88.0 91.1
Base period wages
   (BPW) ($1,000) 20.0 12.1 19.2 23.8 23.4 15.7
High quarter wages
    (HQW) ($1,000) 6.6 4.2 6.4 7.9 7.6 5.5
HQW/BPW (%) 38.8 41.5 38.9 37.9 37.6 40.6
Base period weeks worked 41.1 38.8 41.2 41.2 41.5 41.1
Average weekly wage
1
    (AWW) ($) 487 312 466 578 564 382
Replacement ratio
   (WBA/AWW) (%) 41.5 50.3 43.1 37.2 38.3 45.6
1Average weekly wage is computed as base period wages divided by base period weeks worked.
Source: Unpublished B\benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of
Labor.  37
Table 10. Percent of Aged Units




Sources of money income:
Earnings 80 63 21
  Wages and salaries 77 59 18
  Self-employment income 12 10 4
Retirement benefits 27 63 93
  Social security (SS) 13 53 91
  Benefits other than SS 18 33 41
Income from assets 63 61 63
Veterans benefits 2 4 5
UI benefits 6 3 1
Workers’ compensation 2 2 1
Public assistance 6 6 6
Personal contributions 2 2 1
Number of aged units 
(in thousands) 10,821 3,951 24,553
1An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a non-married person.  
Source:  Social Security Administration, (1998) Table I.138
Table 11. Shares of Aggregate Income of Aged Units




Percent of money income from
  Earnings 80.3 61.6 20.0
  Retirement benefits 8.7 25.6 58.8
  Income from assets 8.2 9.7 18.0
  Public assistance 0.7 0.8 0.8
  Other 2.1 2.2 2.3
Number of aged units (thousands) 10,821 3,951 24,553
1An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a non-married person.  
Source: Social Security Administration (1998), Table  I.1.39
Table 12. Outcomes Observed for UI beneficiaries in the Benefits Accuracy Measurement
Audit Data  
Age Groups
Total <=24  25-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Weekly benefit amount ($) 202 157  201  215  216  174
Duration of benefits (weeks) 15.9 14.7 15.7 16.3 16.6 16.7
Entitlement based on earnings in more than
one state (called a combined wage claim) (%) 2.9 4.0 2.9 3.1 2.2 1.2
Outcomes below refer to the percentage (%)
in each age category during the key week.
Earnings reported 12.2 11.0 12.6 12.0 11.5 10.4
Benefit reduced because of earnings 10.8 7.6 11.4 11.1 10.4 6.4
Other income reported  1.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 4.4 18.6
Benefit reduced because  of other income  1.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 3.8 14.3
Source: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of
Labor.  
Note:    The duration of benefits is measured from the Benefit Year Beginning (BYB) date to the Key Week.  The
Key Week is the week in which a payment was sampled for the BAM data.40
Table 13. Predicted and Actual UI Benefit Exhaustion Rates by Age in Michigan, 1994
Age Groups
<=24 25-34    35-44 45-54 55-64 >=65
Predicted  UI exhaustion rate 0.187 0.208 0.217 0.231 0.231 0.273
Actual  UI exhaustion rate 0.244 0.226 0.212 0.225 0.250 0.370
Sample size 21,855 62,687 59,808 35,947 17,104 3,068
Source: For the control group used to develop the Michigan Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services model
(Eberts and O’Leary, 1996). 